Defining “Customer”: A Survey of Who Can Demand FINRA Arbitration by Burge, Jason W. & Richards, Lara K.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 74 | Number 1
Fall 2013
Defining “Customer”: A Survey of Who Can
Demand FINRA Arbitration
Jason W. Burge
Lara K. Richards
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Jason W. Burge and Lara K. Richards, Defining “Customer”: A Survey of Who Can Demand FINRA Arbitration, 74 La. L. Rev. (2013)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol74/iss1/8
 
 
Defining “Customer”: A Survey of Who Can Demand 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 20 years, courts and legislators have limited the 
rights of plaintiffs to assert securities claims in federal courts in 
response to complaints about abusive litigation.1 The prosecution of 
securities claims has grown more difficult as the Supreme Court has 
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 1. See Richard Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption 
of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32 (1998) 
(describing the “battle” over the merits of securities lawsuits where “plaintiffs’ 
lawyers accuse issuers, underwriters, and accountants of pervasive fraud, and 
they, in turn, charge plaintiffs’ lawyers with greed and opportunism”). Critics of 
the private right of action under the federal securities laws have contended that 
these cases are time-consuming and expensive, only transfer wealth between 
shareholders, and are often merely strike suits that do not benefit shareholders. 
See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 546 (1991) (stating that 
“[s]ecurities cases are large, complex and expensive to litigate, and take a long 
time to resolve” and finding that class actions generally took from 43 to 68 
months from filing to settlement approval and a single case could cost over $1 
million for the plaintiff to litigate (footnote omitted)); Richard A. Booth, The 
Future of Securities Litigation, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 129, 143–44 (2009) 
(arguing that securities fraud class actions “suffer from circularity” because “(1) 
the costs fall on the corporation and thus its stockholders (even though the 
company gained nothing from the fraud), (2) settlements account for a very 
small percentage of total investor losses, and (3) the settlement is effectively 
paid by investors who held shares at the time of the fraud to investors who 
bought during the fraud period” and suggesting that securities class actions 
should be brought derivatively (footnote omitted)); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action 
Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 533 (1997) 
(“One of the most damaging accusations made against class action litigation, 
particularly securities litigation, is the claim that it is ‘lawyer-driven litigation.’ 
In the parlance of, among others, the proponents of the Republican Contract 
with America, lawyer-driven litigation is inherently abusive.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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chipped away at the private right of action.2 Similarly, Congress has 
passed a series of laws targeted at raising the pleading bar for 
plaintiffs in securities actions3 and forcing large securities cases into 
federal court.4 
While litigating securities claims has become more difficult for 
plaintiffs, a rise in the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
(PDAAs) has led to a significant growth in securities arbitration 
under the auspices of the National Association of Securities Dealers 
                                                                                                             
 2. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (barring private plaintiffs from asserting claims for 
aiding and abetting securities fraud); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 
338 (2005) (raising the pleading standards for loss causation in private securities 
actions); Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 159–60 
(2008) (barring private plaintiffs from asserting claims against third-party actors 
under a “scheme liability” theory). 
 3. In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act  
(PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. The explicit goal of the PSLRA 
was to “protect investors, issuers, and all who are associated with our capital 
markets from abusive securities litigation.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 730, 731. See Matthew 
O’Brien, Choice of Forum in Securities Class Actions: Confronting “Reform” of 
the Securities Act of 1933, 28 REV. LITIG. 845, 858 (2009) (“In particular, 
Congress wanted the PSLRA to curtail ‘strike suits’—‘meritless class actions 
alleging fraud in the sale of securities . . . .’” (footnote omitted)). Among other 
provisions, the PSLRA instituted a mandatory stay of discovery until after the 
resolution of an initial motion to dismiss, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b) (2012), and 
greatly increased the pleading burden for plaintiffs by requiring a particularized 
pleading of misrepresentations and scienter. Id. § 78u-4(b). 
 4. In 1998, in response to concerns that plaintiffs were avoiding the 
PSLRA by filing lawsuits in state court, Congress passed the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA). See H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 2 
(1998) (Conf. Rep.) (“[I]n order to prevent certain State private securities class 
action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it is appropriate to enact 
national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally traded 
securities, while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of State 
securities regulators and not changing the current treatment of individual 
lawsuits.”). SLUSA prevents securities class actions from proceeding in state 
court and prevents parties from asserting class actions alleging violations of 
state securities laws. See Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 309 
(6th Cir. 2009) (“After PSLRA became law, some claimants responded by 
‘avoid[ing] the federal forum altogether,’ bringing ‘class actions under state law, 
often in state court’ instead. That apparently was not what Congress had in 
mind. In 1998, it sought to close the gap in coverage by enacting SLUSA. To 
‘prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from 
being used to frustrate the objectives of’ PLSRA, SLUSA expressly prohibits 
certain state law class actions. . . .’” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006)). See 
generally William B. Snyder, Jr., The Securities Act of 1933 after SLUSA: 
Federal Class Actions Belong in Federal Court, 85 N.C. L. REV. 669, 676–77 
(2007). 
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(NASD) and its successor, the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Agency (FINRA), the self-regulatory authorities that oversee the 
securities industry and its arbitral forum.5 At the same time that 
courts were raising the bar for securities litigation, FINRA altered its 
own rules to make the forum more attractive to investors.6 Not 
surprisingly, in recent years a fair amount of litigation has arisen 
around the issue of arbitrability, in which securities industry 
members seek to deny plaintiffs access to FINRA’s arbitral forum 
and force plaintiffs to bring their claims in court.7 
FINRA arbitration is available to any customer of a FINRA 
member for any claim that arises out of that member’s business 
activities, either based upon a written agreement between the parties 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Catherine Moore, The Effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on Arbitration 
Agreements: A Proposal for Consumer Choice, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 503, 
511 (2012) (“[W]hile the investment market has expanded, the number of 
arbitration forums has shrunk to one—FINRA. Thus, there are more consumers 
signing predispute arbitration agreements and only one forum in which they can 
settle their disputes.” (footnote omitted)). 
 6. Two recent pro-customer changes to FINRA rules include allowing 
customers to request an all-public arbitration panel, which does not include an 
industry representative and also limiting motions to dismiss prior to the 
arbitration hearing. See Optional All Public Panel Rule FINRA R. 
12403(c)(1)(A) (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display 
/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4141 (“Rule 12403 . . .  provides 
for limited strikes on the public and public chairperson lists and unlimited 
strikes on the non-public list. In optional all public panel cases, the panel may 
consist of three public arbitrators or two public arbitrators and one non-public 
arbitrator. Under this option, either party can ensure that the panel will have 
three public arbitrators by striking all of the arbitrators on the non-public list.”) 
The Optional All Public Panel Rule went into effect on January 31, 2011. See 
Optional All Public Panel Rules, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration 
andmediation/arbitration/rules/ruleguidance/noticestoparties/p123997; see also 
FINRA R. 12504(a) (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=7377; News Release, 
FINRA, SEC Approves FINRA Rule to Drastically Limit Motions to Dismiss in 
Arbitration (Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom 
/NewsReleases/2009/P117686 (“By narrowing significantly the grounds for 
granting dispositive motions before investors present their case, the new rule 
will ensure that claimants in arbitration have a full opportunity to argue their 
case. Under the new rule, a motion to dismiss before a claimant’s case is 
presented can only be granted on three specific grounds, and there are stringent 
new sanctions against parties for engaging in abusive case-dismissal 
practices.”).  FINRA Rule 12405 went into effect on February 23, 2009. 
 7. See Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do 
Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415, 416, 419–
31 (2003) (outlining situations in which FINRA members have gone to court to 
enjoin arbitration). “Illustrating a classic example of ‘be careful what you wish 
for,’ brokerage firms no longer find arbitration entirely to their liking. 
Increasingly they turn to the courts to resist arbitration, to interfere with ongoing 
arbitration, or to undo the results of arbitration.” Id. 
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or the customer’s demand.8 Many investors have PDAAs with their 
brokerage firms, binding them to FINRA arbitration of their claims.9 
But for plaintiffs who do not have PDAAs or who seek to assert 
claims against FINRA members other than their brokers, FINRA 
rules grant them the option of arbitration at their choosing but only 
if they are a customer of the member.10 Remarkably, given the broad 
nature of this right to arbitrate, FINRA has made almost no attempt 
to define “customer” as used in its rules.11 Accordingly, courts have 
been forced to wrestle with the definition on a case-by-case basis 
with disparate results and resulting confusion about which claimants 
are entitled to arbitrate.12 
Debating the proper definition of a FINRA “customer” is not 
merely a theoretical or academic exercise. Greater urgency may 
soon arise around this issue given that The Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act) expressly 
grants the SEC authority to bar the use of PDAAs in brokerage 
agreements.13 If the SEC exercises this authority to bar PDAAs, 
                                                                                                             
 8. FINRA R. 12200 (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4106. 
 9. See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 59, 61 (2010) (“Currently, virtually all broker-dealers include in their 
customers’ agreements a predispute arbitration agreement (PDAA) that requires 
customers to arbitrate their disputes before the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) arbitration forum.” (footnote omitted)). 
 10. FINRA R. 12200. 
 11. The only definition of “customer” that FINRA provides within its 
Arbitration Code is that it “shall not include a broker or dealer.” FINRA R. 
12100(i) (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display 
.html?rbid=2403&record_id=15138&element_id=4099&highlight=12100%28i
%29. See discussion infra Section III. 
 12. See discussion infra Sections III, IV. 
 13. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o). As stated: 
Authority to restrict mandatory pre-dispute arbitration: The 
Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations 
on the use of, agreements that require customers or clients of any 
broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future 
dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws, the 
rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory 
organization if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, 
or limitations are in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors. 
Id. Recently, the SEC Commissioner and 37 members of Congress have urged 
the SEC to exercise this discretion and bar pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 
See Sarah N. Lynch, Lawmakers Urge U.S. SEC to Bar Forced Wall Street 
Arbitration, REUTERS, Apr. 30, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com 
/article/2013/04/30/congress-sec-arbitration-idUSL2N0DH1VZ20130430; Luis 
A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Outmanned and Outgunned: 
Fighting on Behalf of Investors Despite Efforts to Weaken Investor Protections 
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securities arbitration for investors would revert to a largely optional 
system, available at the customers’ elections. Given the broad 
differences in procedural and substantive rules applicable to 
litigation and FINRA arbitration14—which may even include 
additional substantive causes of action for arbitral claimants15—an 
entirely optional system would grant significant advantages to 
investor–plaintiffs and excite further attention upon who is a 
customer entitled to demand arbitration. The current legal morass on 
this issue, in which courts have espoused several disparate 
definitions of “customer” in resolving cases, provides little guidance 
to parties about whether claims are properly asserted in arbitration. 
This Article begins with two background sections. Section I 
provides background on FINRA, the regulatory authority overseeing 
the securities industry. Section II delves into FINRA arbitration with 
a particular focus on Rule 12200, which grants customers a 
unilateral right to demand arbitration. In Section III, this Article 
surveys the case law on arbitrability across a number of fact patterns 
to demonstrate the current state of the law on the definition of 
“customer” as it pertains to FINRA arbitration. In Section IV, this 
Article analyzes how courts have reached the current state of the law 
by considering four theories of “customer” that courts have relied on 
in deciding cases. Finally, in conclusion, the authors argue for a 
definition of “customer” consistent with the term’s ordinary 
meaning and the scope of FINRA regulation to provide broad access 
to the FINRA forum for customers who have direct and regulated 
relationships with FINRA members. 
                                                                                                             
 
(Apr. 16, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech 
/1365171515400) (“[M]y main concern with pre-dispute mandatory arbitration 
is the denial of investor choice; investors should not have their option of 
choosing between arbitration and the traditional judicial process taken away 
from them at the very beginning of their relationship with their brokers and 
advisers . . . . I believe the Commission needs to be proactive in this important 
area. We need to support investor choice.”); Letter from 37 congressmen to 
Mary Jo White, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2381 (“The exigent 
circumstances at hand, however, require that the Commission exercise its 
authority under Section 921 of the Dodd-Frank Act and prohibit the use of 
mandatory arbitration provisions.”). 
 14. See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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I. FINRA REGULATES THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
FINRA is the comprehensive, self-regulatory organization 
(SRO) governing the securities industry.16 FINRA was established 
under § 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act), which requires the formation of a “national securities 
association” to regulate the securities industry.17 Although overseen 
by the SEC,18 FINRA is an independent body given broad powers to 
police the industry in order “to protect investors and the public 
interest.”19 As FINRA describes on its website: 
We examine broker-dealers for compliance with our own 
rules; we also examine them for compliance with federal 
securities laws and rules of the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board. . . . FINRA is not part of the 
government. We are an independent regulator authorized by 
Congress to take action to ensure that investors are 
protected. We do the front-line work for the SEC under that 
                                                                                                             
 16. See FINRA, GET TO KNOW US i (2012), available at http://www 
.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/documents/corporate/p118667.p
df (“FINRA is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. We’re an 
independent, not-for-profit organization with a public mission: to protect 
America’s investors by making sure the securities industry operates fairly and 
honestly. . . . Our independent regulation plays a critical role in America’s 
financial system—by enforcing high ethical standards, bringing the necessary 
resources and expertise to regulation and enhancing investor safeguards and 
market integrity . . . .”). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(2) (2012). In 1938, the Maloney Act amended the 
Exchanged Act to permit broker–dealers to create a self-regulatory organization 
to oversee the securities industry. Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 
Stat. 1070 (1938). 
 18. Pursuant to the Maloney Act, any self-regulatory organization 
regulating the securities industry is required to file an application for registration 
with the SEC that includes the association’s rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a) (2012). 
Thereafter, the organization is required to obtain SEC approval for any changes 
to the organization’s rules. Id. § 78s(b). 
 19. Id. § 78o-3(b)(6). The Exchange Act requires that the “national 
securities association” pass rules to regulate the industry to achieve certain 
goals. See id. As stated: 
The rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable 
principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with persons 
engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with 
respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove 
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market 
and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and 
the public interest . . . .  
Id. 
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agency’s oversight. If brokers break the rules, we can fine 
them, suspend them and even put them out of business.20 
FINRA was created in 2007 through the consolidation of the 
NASD and New York Stock Exchange Regulation, Inc. (NYSE 
Regulation), the regulatory arm of the New York Stock Exchange 
LLC.21 Prior to the consolidation, the NASD and NYSE Regulation 
operated separate regulatory departments, which often resulted “in a 
duplicative, sometimes conflicting system that makes inefficient use 
of resources and, as such, can be detrimental to the ultimate goal of 
investor protection.”22 Having one SRO responsible for regulating 
the securities industry streamlined regulatory review, thereby 
benefitting not only member firms but also better protecting 
investors.23 FINRA, as the newly formed joint entity, became 
“responsible for regulatory oversight of all securities firms that do 
business with the public.”24 
                                                                                                             
 20. About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/P125239 (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2013). 
 21. See Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, S.E.C. Release No. 34-55495, 
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Related to Governance and to 
Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of 
NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc. 1–2 (Mar. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Notice of 
Filing Proposed Rule Change], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro 
/nasd/2007/34-55495.pdf; Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, S.E.C. Release No. 
34-56145, Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Related to Governance and 
to Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory Functions 
of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., 1 (July 26, 2007) [hereinafter Order 
Approving Proposed Rule Change], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro 
/nasd/2007/34-56145.pdf. For a general discussion on the formation of FINRA 
and its predecessor, NASD, see Wachovia Bank, Nat. Ass’n v. VCG Special 
Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 661 F.3d 164, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2011); Roney & 
Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218, 1221–22 (6th Cir. 1989); Black, supra note 9, at 
63–64. 
 22. See Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 21, at 2. 
 23. See id. at 9 (“[F]irms that today are regulated by both NASD and NYSE 
Regulation will benefit from the elimination of the current duplication of 
regulatory review of these firms. . . . [Having one SRO] will further benefit 
members as it will streamline the broker-dealer regulatory system, combine 
technologies and permit the establishment of a single set of rules and group 
examiners with complementary areas of expertise in a single organization–all of 
which will serve to enhance oversight of U.S. securities firms and help to ensure 
investor protection.”). 
 24. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, supra note 21, at 3; see 
also UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (noting that FINRA “has had the authority to exercise comprehensive 
oversight over ‘all securities firms that do business with the public’” (quoting 
Sacks v. SEC, 648 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2011))). 
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Membership in FINRA is essentially mandatory to participate in 
the securities industry.25 Any broker26 or dealer27 who wishes to 
transact in securities must register with FINRA unless they transact 
solely through a national securities exchange, in which case they 
must register through the exchange.28 Because FINRA was formed 
by the merger of the NASD with the NYSE, the nation’s largest 
national securities exchange, effectively all but a vanishingly few 
securities firms are registered with FINRA.29 Once a firm is 
registered, its officers, partners, and supervisory managers must 
register with FINRA as principals,30 and any persons actively 
involved in the firm’s securities business must register with FINRA 
                                                                                                             
 25. See Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, S.E.C. Release No. 34-50700, 
Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation 2 (Nov. 28, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-50700.htm (“Self-regulation is a key 
component of U.S. securities industry regulation. All broker-dealers are required 
to be members of a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”), which sets standards, 
conducts examinations, and enforces rules regarding its members.”). For an 
overview of the history of arbitration agreements in securities disputes, see 
Moore, supra note 5, at 507–24. 
 26. “Broker” is defined by the Exchange Act as “any person engaged in the 
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
 27. “Dealer” is defined by the Exchange Act as “any person engaged in the 
business of buying and selling securities . . . for such person’s own account 
through a broker or otherwise.” Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A). There is an exception written 
into the rule for persons that buy or sell securities for their own account but “not 
as part of a regular business,” which exempts ordinary investors from FINRA 
regulation so long as their trading of securities is not a regular business. Id. § 
78c(a)(5)(B). 
 28. Under § 15(a) of the Exchange Act, it is illegal for any broker or dealer 
to transact or attempt to transact in any security, with few exceptions, unless the 
broker–dealer  is registered with either a registered securities association or with 
a national securities exchange—in which case the broker or dealer must only 
transact in securities through that exchange. Id. §§ 78o(b)(1), (8). The 
exceptions are for exempted securities, commercial paper, bankers’ acceptances, 
and commercial bills. Id. § 78o(a)(1). Presently, FINRA is the only registered 
securities association recognized by the SEC. See Self-Regulatory Organization 
Rulemaking, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 
2013). 
 29. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Statement at 
News Conference Announcing NYSE–NASD Regulatory Merger (Nov. 28, 
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch112806cc.htm 
(announcing that merger would create “a single self regulator for all firms in the 
securities industry.”); see also GET TO KNOW US, supra note 16,  at 3 (“Every 
firm and broker that sells securities in the U.S. must be licensed and registered 
by FINRA: 4,400 securities firms, 163,000 branch offices, [and] 630,000 
registered securities representatives.”). 
 30. FINRA R. 1021(b) (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4254&element_id=3579&highlight
=1021%28b%29. 
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as representatives.31 Effectively, then, FINRA’s regulatory scope 
includes any firm or individual who transacts business in securities 
either for its own account or for the account of another.32 
By becoming a FINRA member, entities gain the right to 
operate a business trading securities, but they also gain regulatory 
requirements and obligations to the larger investing public and their 
customers under FINRA Rules.33 As discussed in the next Section, 
one of those rules includes mandatory submission to arbitration 
when demanded by a customer. 
                                                                                                             
 31. FINRA R. 1031(b) (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4260&element_id=3584&highlight
=1031. 
 32. FINRA’s overall “Objects or Purposes” are discussed in its Restated 
Certificate of Incorporation and include: 
(1) To promote through cooperative effort the investment banking and 
securities business, to standardize its principles and practices, to 
promote therein high standards of commercial honor, and to encourage 
and promote among members observance of federal and state 
securities laws; (2) To provide a medium through which its 
membership may be enabled to confer, consult, and cooperate with 
governmental and other agencies in the solution of problems affecting 
investors, the public, and the investment banking and securities 
business; (3) To adopt, administer, and enforce rules of fair practice 
and rules to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, and 
in general to promote just and equitable principles of trade for the 
protection of investors; (4) To promote self-discipline among members, 
and to investigate and adjust grievances between the public and 
members and between members . . . . 
Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, Inc., FINRA (July 2, 2010), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display 
/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4589 (emphasis added). One significant 
part of the investment industry that is not currently regulated by FINRA is 
investment advisors who are covered by the Advisors Act. Recent concerns 
about regulation of investment advisors in light of the Bernie Madoff scandal 
has attracted congressional attention and led to the possibility of establishing 
self-regulatory organization oversight of investment advisors, an industry 
FINRA has expressed a willingness to cover. See Kirill Kan, The Importance of 
FINRA’s Arbitrator Selection Process and Clarity in the “Evident Partiality” 
Standard in the Wake of Morgan Keegan, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 
172 (2012) (describing proposed Investment Adviser Oversight Act and noting 
that “FINRA has already voiced its willingness to assume responsibility for this 
newly created SRO, which would regulate investment advisers.” (footnote 
omitted)). Accordingly, FINRA’s regulatory scope may expand further in the 
coming years. 
 33. See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 
648 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Upon joining FINRA, a member organization agrees to 
comply with FINRA’s rules.”); Id. at 649 (“As a FINRA member, therefore, 
UBS is bound to adhere to FINRA’s rules and regulations, including its Code 
and relevant arbitration provisions contained therein.”). 
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II. FINRA ARBITRATION IS AVAILABLE TO “CUSTOMERS” OF FINRA 
MEMBERS 
In addition to its regulatory and enforcement arms, FINRA 
provides a dispute-resolution forum for disputes arising between 
members and their customers or between members.34 FINRA 
oversees approximately 90% of all arbitrations of securities 
disputes.35 FINRA has two separate codes of arbitration procedure 
that provide the rules for the arbitral forum.36 The Customer Code 
governs arbitration between members of FINRA and their 
customers, and the Industry Code provides rules for disputes 
between or among FINRA members only.37 
Since the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in Shearson/American 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon38 and its 1989 decision in Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,39 which cleared the way 
for pre-dispute arbitration clauses in securities account agreements, 
most FINRA customer arbitrations are compelled by the customer’s 
agreement.40 But beginning in 1973, FINRA’s rules, as well as the 
                                                                                                             
 34. See Arbitration & Mediation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration 
andmediation/index.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2013) (“FINRA operates the 
largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry to assist in the 
resolution of monetary and business disputes between and among investors, 
brokerage firms and individual brokers.”). 
 35. DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL xiv 
(5th ed. 2005) (“NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. now administers 95% of all 
securities arbitrations.”). 
 36. See Code of Arbitration Procedure, FINRA, http://www.finra.org 
/arbitrationandmediation/arbitration/rules/codeofarbitrationProcedure/ (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2013). 
 37. See id. 
 38. 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (holding that pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
are enforceable for claims arising under the Exchange Act). 
 39. 490 U.S. 477, 478 (1989) (holding that pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
are enforceable for claims arising under the Securities Act, overruling Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953)). For a full discussion of the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on consumer securities arbitration, see Matthew 
Eisler, Difficult, Duplicative and Wasteful?: The NASD’s Prohibition of Class 
Action Arbitration in the Post-Bazzle Era, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1900–05 
(2007). Interestingly, prior to the Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Wilko 
invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements for Securities Act claims, 
“[f]rom 1925 to 1953, predispute arbitration agreements were regularly enforced 
in the securities industry.” Moore, supra note 5, at 507. 
 40. See Guy Nelson, The Unclear “Clear and Unmistakable” Standard: 
Why Arbitrators, Not Courts, Should Determine Whether a Securities Investor’s 
Claim Is Arbitrable, 54 VAND. L. REV. 591, 609 (2001) (“Although they are not 
mandatory, most brokers demand that their retail customers sign such 
agreements.”); Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: 
The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 991 (2002) 
(“[M]ost customer disputes are resolved in arbitration in a dispute resolution 
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rules of its predecessor, the NASD, have included a requirement that 
members arbitrate disputes if requested by a customer, regardless of 
whether the parties executed a separate arbitration agreement.41 
The current version of that rule is FINRA Rule 12200, which 
requires that members of FINRA arbitrate a dispute arising in 
connection with the member’s business activities under certain 
circumstances.42 The Rule states in full: 
Parties must arbitrate a dispute under the Code if: 
 • Arbitration under the Code is either: 
  (1) Required by a written agreement, or 
  (2) Requested by the customer; • The dispute is between a customer and a member or 
associated person of a member; and • The dispute arises in connection with the business 
activities of the member or the associated person, except 
disputes involving the insurance business activities of a 
member that is also an insurance company.43 
Rule 12200 became effective on April 16, 2007, and 
incorporated former NASD Rule 10301, which is substantively 
identical.44 Notably, Rule 12200 gives the customer the unilateral 
                                                                                                             
 
forum sponsored by a securities self-regulatory organization (“SRO”).”  
(footnote omitted)). 
 41. The NASD initially codified this rule in section 12 of the NASD Code, 
which was subsequently recodified into NASD Rule 10301. For a full discussion 
of the history of section 12, see Moore, supra note 5, at 508–09. 
 42. See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 324 (4th Cir. 
2013) (“In becoming members of FINRA, UBS and Citi agreed to mandatory 
arbitration of specified disputes with customers when the customer ‘requests’ 
such arbitration.”); UBS Sec. LLC v. Allina Health Sys., CIV. 12-2090 
(MJD/JJG), 2013 WL 500373, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 11, 2013) (“FINRA requires 
its member firms to resolve disputes with their customers in FINRA arbitration 
if the conditions in Rule 12200 are satisfied.”). 
 43. FINRA R. 12200 (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4106. 
 44. NASD Rule 10301(a) provided: 
Any dispute, claim, or controversy eligible for submission under the 
Rule 10100 Series between a customer and a member and/or associated 
person arising in connection with the business of such member or in 
connection with the activities of such associated persons shall be 
arbitrated under this Code, as provided by any duly executed and 
enforceable written agreement or upon the demand of the customer. 
NASD R. 10301, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display 
viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=7895&record_id=10957. See also Herbert 
J. Sims & Co. v. Roven, 548 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Rule 
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right to demand arbitration, giving a customer who did not sign a 
pre-dispute arbitration agreement the ability to weigh the benefits of 
proceeding with a claim either through litigation in state or federal 
court or through the FINRA arbitral forum.45  
Section 12 of the NASD code [FINRA’s predecessor] 
requires that if desired by a customer, a member must submit 
a dispute to arbitration. This code section meant that while 
brokerage firms could not compel arbitration through 
predispute agreements, customers with claims under federal 
securities law could compel firms to arbitrate their claims. 
Since the adoption of the NASD code, in the absence of 
predispute arbitration agreements, customers can select to 
arbitrate or litigate.46 
Unlike customers, FINRA members are required to submit any 
dispute with another member to arbitration under Industry Code 
Rule 13200.47 
In light of the fact that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are 
nearly universally required by securities firms,48 it might seem odd 
                                                                                                             
 
12200 of the Code is an amended version of former Rule 10301 that went into 
effect on April 16, 2007. The cases interpreting and applying Rule 10301 apply 
with equal force to Rule 12200, as the amendment did not effect any substantive 
change to the rule.”). 
 45. Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts P’ship, 41 F.3d 861, 864 
(2d Cir. 1994) (noting that the NASD rules, the predecessor to FINRA, grant 
“the customer a unilateral option to compel arbitration, a very advantageous 
power”). 
 46. Moore, supra note 5, at 508–09 (footnotes omitted). See also Alexander 
Ziccardi, Bucking the Trend: A Case for Rejecting an Emerging Narrow View of 
Who Qualifies as a Customer in FINRA Arbitration, 19 PIABA B.J. 57, 58 
(2012) (“It is important to note that only the customer can compel arbitration 
under [FINRA Rule 12200]; the option is unavailable to the member firm.”). 
 47. The full text of Rule 13200 reads: 
Rule 13200: Required Arbitration 
(a) Generally: Except as otherwise provided in the Code, a dispute must 
be arbitrated under the Code if the dispute arises out of the business 
activities of a member or an associated person and is between or 
among: 
•  Members; 
•  Members and Associated Persons; or 
•  Associated Persons. 
(b) Insurance Activities: Disputes arising out of the insurance business 
activities of a member that is also an insurance company are not 
required to be arbitrated under the Code. 
FINRA R. 13200 (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display 
/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4203. 
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that customers might actually prefer arbitration to litigation. 
Nonetheless, academic research is beginning to recognize that, in 
certain circumstances, securities arbitration is actually preferable to 
litigation.49 Empirical and anecdotal evidence also shows that more 
and more securities firms are challenging the right of customers to 
assert their claims in arbitration, suggesting that the securities firms 
often prefer to face these claims in court.50 
There are numerous procedural differences between FINRA 
arbitration and litigation that would inform a customer’s choice of 
whether to demand arbitration, a few of which include:51 
• FINRA Rules do not allow dispositive motions (e.g., 
motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment) 
prior to a hearing, except for very limited reasons;52 
                                                                                                             
 
 48. See, e.g., Black, supra note 9, at 61 (“Currently, virtually all broker-
dealers include in their customers’ agreements a predispute arbitration 
agreement (PDAA) that requires customers to arbitrate their disputes before the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration forum.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 49. Eisler, supra note 39, at 1893 (“Although arbitration is admittedly not a 
perfect system, credible empirical data suggests that arbitration provides 
substantial advantages to claimants as compared to litigation.” (footnote 
omitted)); Amnon Wenger, Note, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Don’t Get Sued: 
Should A Private Cause of Action Exist for A Violation of NASD Conduct Rule 
3010?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 314 (2005) (“As courts have restricted the 
ability of harmed investors to seek redress through litigation, these investors 
increasingly have turned to arbitration.” (footnote omitted)); Moore, supra, note 
5, at 518–19 (“It is also crucial to recognize that even if investors and consumers 
choose to litigate their claims, they are not assured of a more favorable outcome 
than what they would get in arbitration nor are they guaranteed of any financial 
savings.” (footnote omitted)); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The 
Stakes in the Debate over Predisputes Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 564 (2001) (arguing that arbitration provides a 
better option for the many plaintiffs whose claims are not large enough to attract 
legal representation for litigation). 
 50. See Black, supra note 7, at 419 (“As Howsam illustrates, brokerage 
firms frequently go to court to enjoin pending arbitrations on grounds that they 
have not agreed to arbitrate the dispute or that arbitration is inappropriate for 
some other reason.”); cf. Smoothline Ltd. v. N. Am. Foreign Trading Corp., 249 
F.3d 147, 148 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that parties often go to “herculean efforts to 
avoid resolution of disputes through arbitration”). 
 51. For a fuller discussion of the benefits and disadvantages of FINRA 
arbitration from the customer perspective, see Black & Gross, supra note 40, at 
1035–40. See also SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER ON 
ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/societies/sifma_compliance_and_legal_soci
ety/whitepaperonarbitration-october2007.pdf (explaining SRO arbitration 
procedure to securities industry firms). 
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• FINRA Rules greatly restrict discovery compared to 
litigation, as interrogatories and depositions are typically 
not allowed;53 • Arbitration is often considered to be faster and less 
expensive than litigation;54 • FINRA arbitrators are not required to give written 
reasons for their awards,55 and their awards are typically 
not appealable;56 and 
                                                                                                             
 
 52. FINRA R. 12504(a) (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4141. 
 53. FINRA R. 12505–511 (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4153. To view a copy of 
FINRA’s Discovery Guide (2011), visit FINRA’s website at http://www 
.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitrators/CaseGuidanceResources/Discov
eryGuide/. See also Mark K. Davis, Forum Shopping: What Forums Are 
Available to Investors Who Pursue Claims Against Their Brokers and Which 
Best Protects Their Rights?, 14 PIABA B.J. 41, 51 (2007) (“Perhaps the most 
problematic issues posed by the NASD arbitration process include the rule 
prohibiting the use of interrogatories, the policy strongly discouraging the use of 
depositions, and the potential for bias in arbitrators.”). Note that this third issue 
has been resolved by recent FINRA Rule changes allowing customers to request 
panels without an industry arbitrator. See supra note 6. 
 54. Moore, supra note 5, at 522 (“Unlike litigation, arbitration can also 
represent a time savings—FINRA arbitration takes an average of twelve months, 
exhibiting a significant reduction in time invested in the average case.” (footnote 
omitted)); Estreicher, supra note 49, at 564 (“There seems little dispute that 
because arbitration proceedings tend to be informal (and quicker), they require 
less lawyer time and resources.” (footnote omitted)). But see Georgios Zekos, 
Realities of Securities Arbitration in the USA Today, 12 VINDOBONA J. OF INTL. 
COMM. L. & ARBITRATION 33, 41 (2008) (arguing that arbitration is not “quick, 
economical, or informal” but, in practice, is “much closer to litigation” and 
citing the statistic that where the average NASD arbitration lasts 17 months, the 
average time taken to run a case to conclusion in a Federal District Court is 9.3 
months”); Black, supra note 7, at 452 (reviewing the costs of arbitration and 
litigation and concluding that an “independent comparison of the costs to 
investors between arbitration and litigation is necessary before conclusions, even 
tentative ones, can be made”). 
 55. FINRA R. 12904 (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192. The lack of written 
awards limits the value of an arbitration decision in contexts where collateral 
estoppel or res judicata might apply, which may disadvantage groups of like-
situated claimants. See, e.g., Eisler, supra note 39, at 1895–96 (“The arbitral 
panel rarely delivers its decision with a thorough description of the facts of the 
case or a textual reasoning for the ruling. Therefore, if an issue is resolved once 
in arbitration, it would have to be resolved again if that same issue arose in a 
later proceeding. For example, in actions where numerous claimants are 
similarly situated, each individual claimant would be forced to resolve their 
dispute against the same corporate defendant who often has superior resources. 
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• FINRA arbitrators are not strictly bound to follow the 
law, and they have recognized claims based on breaches 
of FINRA regulations that would not constitute valid 
causes of action in court.57 
These procedural differences obviously cut both in favor of and 
against claimants, and weighing whether arbitration or litigation is 
preferable will depend on the specific facts of the dispute.58 But on 
balance, FINRA arbitration is generally regarded as a fair forum for 
investor–claimants,59 and in recent years, FINRA has changed its 
                                                                                                             
 
This is disadvantageous for claimants, especially if the class action device is not 
available.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 56. See, e.g., Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Garrett, 495 F. App’x 443, 446 
(5th Cir. 2012) (“Judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily 
narrow. It is also exceedingly deferential. Importantly, ‘[a]n award may not be 
set aside for a mere mistake of fact or law.’” (internal citations omitted) (quoting 
Apache Bohai Corp. LDC v. Texaco China BV, 480 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 
2007))); see also Black, supra note 7, at 453 (noting that the FAA provides only 
“limited judicial review of arbitration awards to assure that the process was 
fair”). 
 57. See Black & Gross, supra note 40, at 1040–43 (arguing that arbitration 
allows investors to assert claims based on “margin sellouts, economic suicide, 
and liability of clearing brokers,” which would be dismissed in court); Wenger, 
supra note 49, at 316 (arguing that “failure to supervise” claims are frequently 
raised in arbitration, in large part because courts refuse to recognize such 
claims). 
 58. See Black, supra note 9, at 93–105. As the author wrote: 
Once a dispute has arisen, each side will have a view about whether its 
claim will fare better in court or in arbitration. . . . Consider, for example, 
a $25,000 claim for a breach of the suitability rule. The investor is likely 
to want arbitration, while the firm has strategic advantages to insist on 
court. It will not be cost-efficient for the investor to litigate this claim, 
and there is no private cause of action for breach of an SRO rule. 
Conversely, if a disabled investor has a $5 million claim against his 
broker-dealer for fraudulent misrepresentations that caused him to lose 
his money in a Ponzi scheme, the investor’s attorney will likely want to 
take the case to a jury, with all the attendant publicity, while the firm 
would prefer arbitration of the claim. 
Id. at 93. 
 59. Id. at 73 (“Many investors perceive the FINRA arbitration forum as 
unfair, although academics who have studied the forum award it high marks for 
meeting most generally recognized standards of fairness.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Jill I. Gross, Mcmahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities 
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 517 (2008) (“My review has led me to 
conclude that, as a result of SEC oversight, investors have access to a 
fundamentally fair dispute resolution process that enables them to vindicate their 
statutory rights to the same degree as, if not more so, than in court.”). 
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rules to resolve some of the investors’ principal complaints.60 In 
short, the right to choose between litigation and FINRA arbitration 
is indeed a “very advantageous power,”61 as long as the claimant is a 
“customer” who has the power to choose. 
III. CASE LAW ON “CUSTOMER” UNDER FINRA RULE 12200 AND ITS 
ANTECEDENTS62 
Although FINRA Rule 12200 plainly creates a right for customers 
of FINRA members to demand arbitration of claims arising out of a 
member’s business activities,63 FINRA provides very little guidance 
as to what categories of persons are “customers” entitled to demand 
                                                                                                             
 60. One of the principal previous complaints that investors had about 
FINRA arbitration was that panels were required to have one industry arbitrator, 
which many investors perceived to be a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Moore, 
supra note 5, at 511 (“It is significant that FINRA is the only arbitration 
provider for consumer-broker disputes given the nature of FINRA arbitration 
and what some consumers feel is a biased system that favors the interests of 
industry defendants over the interests of consumers. At the core of the 
allegations of bias is the fact that in three-member arbitration panels, one 
member is part of the securities industry because they are a FINRA member.” 
(footnotes omitted)). In 2011, FINRA changed this rule, allowing customers to 
choose an “all-public panel,” which would have no arbitrators presently 
employed in or representing the securities industry. FINRA R. 12403 (2013), 
available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403 
&element_id=4141 (amending 2011 version of rule to simplify panel selection 
process while reaffirming customer’s right to an all-public panel). 
 61. Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts P’ship, 41 F.3d 861, 864 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
 62. FINRA Rule 12200 is the successor rule to NASD Section 12 and 
NASD Rule 10301, all of which are substantively identical on the issue of the 
ability of customers to demand arbitration. See supra notes 42–47 and 
accompanying text. Courts routinely rely on case law interpreting the prior rules 
in resolving cases arising under Rule 12200. See supra note 44. In order to 
provide clarity in the text, this Article will refer to FINRA Rule 12200 
throughout, even though much of the case law predates the current iteration of 
the rule. 
 63. See, e.g., Oppenheimer & Co. v. Neidhardt, No. 93 Civ. 3854 (SS), 
1994 WL 176976, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 1994), aff’d, 56 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 
1995) (“Member securities dealers are subject to a compulsory arbitration 
agreement intended directly to benefit their customers.” (footnote omitted)); 
Scobee Combs Funeral Home, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 711 F. Supp. 605, 607 
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (“Parties may create rights in a third-party beneficiary by 
manifesting an intention to do so. . . . In this case, the very words of the NASD 
provision on required submission to arbitration indicate that member securities 
dealers intended to directly benefit their customers by granting them a right to 
demand arbitration, even in the absence of a written agreement.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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arbitration.64 The only definition that FINRA provides of the term 
“customer” is that it “shall not include a broker or dealer.”65 This 
negative definition is not only remarkably uninstructive,66 but when 
combined with other FINRA rules that require arbitration of disputes 
between brokers and dealers,67 the definition appears to suggest that 
FINRA members are required to submit to arbitration demanded by 
literally anyone. Courts have not hesitated to find this definition alone 
“too broad.”68 
Unsatisfied with the negative definition, courts have sought to 
move beyond it and positively determine whether a party seeking 
arbitration is a customer of a member. This Section will examine the 
case law across a number of contexts including: (1) privity between 
the member and the customer; (2) issuers of securities, rather than 
                                                                                                             
 64. See Ziccardi, supra note 46, at 59 (“[S]ome members of the industry 
have suggested to FINRA that it should offer a more comprehensive definition 
of customer. The Approval Order for the amendments made to the Customer 
Code effective after April 16, 2007 noted that many commenters requested a 
more comprehensive definition of customer. Despite these requests, FINRA 
opted to retain the bare-bone definition of customer when it adopted its new 
Customer Code.” (footnote omitted)). 
 65. FINRA R. 12100(i) (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4099. 
 66. See, e.g., Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Agresti, No. 11-5229 (PGS), 2012 
WL 4505897, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2012) (“Rather than provide an affirmative 
definition of ‘customer,’ Rule 12100(i) of the FINRA Code defines ‘customer’ 
only in the negative, as it states: ‘[a] customer shall not include a broker or 
dealer.’” (alteration in original)). 
 67. See FINRA R. 13200(a) (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com 
/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4203 (“Except as 
otherwise provided in the Code, a dispute must be arbitrated under the Code if 
the dispute arises out of the business activities of a member or an associated 
person and is between or among: Members; Members and Associated Persons; 
or Associated Persons.”); FINRA R. 13100(o) (2013), available at http://finra 
.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4196. 
(“For purposes of the Code, the term ‘member’ means any broker or dealer 
admitted to membership in FINRA, whether or not the membership has been 
terminated or cancelled; and any broker or dealer admitted to membership in a 
self-regulatory organization that, with FINRA consent, has required its members 
to arbitrate pursuant to the Code and/or to be treated as members of FINRA for 
purposes of the Code, whether or not the membership has been terminated or 
cancelled.”). 
 68. Fleet Boston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Innovex, Inc., 264 F.3d 770, 
772 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[The defendant] argues that by negative inference this 
definition means a ‘customer’ is everyone who is not a broker or dealer. We 
agree with the district court that this definition is too broad.”). But see Bank of 
the Commonwealth v. Hudspeth, 714 S.E.2d 566, 572 (Va. 2011) (holding that a 
bank was a “customer” entitled to compel arbitration of a claim brought against 
the bank by its former vice president who was also a registered securities 
representative based primarily on the definition of customer as not “a broker or 
dealer” and the presumption in favor of arbitration). 
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investors; (3) members who provide banking or financial advice to a 
customer; and (4) timing issues presented by former customers and/or 
former members. The goal of this survey is to show where courts 
have decided to draw the line on who is a customer in each of these 
contexts. 
A. Privity Between the Customer and a Member 
There is no dispute over the fact that investors are customers of 
their brokers under FINRA Rule 12200. This investor–broker 
relationship is the prototypical customer relationship that FINRA 
members point to when arguing that other relationships do not qualify 
the claimant as a customer.69 But even when investors seek arbitration 
under Rule 12200, there is an issue of whether the relationship 
between the investor and the FINRA member is substantial enough to 
justify calling the investor that member’s customer. Essentially, this is 
a privity issue: How closely connected to the FINRA member does 
the investor have to be to qualify as a customer who can demand 
arbitration? 
One of the first cases to consider privity was Oppenheimer & Co. 
v. Neidhardt, in which the Second Circuit considered a situation 
where investors intended to invest through a FINRA member, but due 
to fraud of that member’s associated person,70 the FINRA member 
                                                                                                             
 69. See, e.g., UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 
643, 652 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We also reject UBS’s contention that FINRA has a 
narrow ‘investor-protection mandate,’ such that ‘customers’ should include only 
those receiving ‘investment or brokerage services.’”); Fleet Boston, 264 F.3d at 
771 (“This question hinges upon whether the term ‘customer’ applies only to 
those who received investment or brokerage services, or whether it also applies 
to those who received banking and financial advice, as AdFlex did in this 
case.”). 
 70. Associated person is defined by the FINRA rules as: 
(1) a natural person registered under NASD Rules; or (2) a sole 
proprietor, or any partner, officer, director, branch manager of the 
Applicant, or any person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions; (3) any company, government or political 
subdivision or agency or instrumentality of a government controlled by 
or controlling the Applicant; (4) any employee of the Applicant, except 
any person whose functions are solely clerical or ministerial; (5) any 
person directly or indirectly controlling the Applicant whether or not 
such person is registered or exempt from registration under the FINRA 
By-Laws or NASD Rules; (6) any person engaged in investment 
banking or securities business controlled directly or indirectly by the 
Applicant whether such person is registered or exempt from registration 
under the FINRA By-Laws or NASD Rules; or (7) any person who will 
be or is anticipated to be a person described in (1) through (6) above. 
FINRA R. 1011(b) (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display 
/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3567&print=1. 
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was never aware of the investors.71 The Neidhardt claimants were 
investors who were defrauded when a vice president of Oppenheimer 
solicited their funds to open an account at Oppenheimer but instead 
opened the account in the name of an unrelated corporation, listing 
two of the vice president’s fraudulent confederates as the 
corporation’s controlling officers.72 When the investors sought to 
compel arbitration, Oppenheimer objected, claiming that the account 
was set up in the name of the corporation and that the investors were 
“strangers to Oppenheimer[, which] never agreed to establish a 
customer relationship with them.”73 The court rejected this analysis, 
relying on the fact that Oppenheimer was responsible for the acts of 
its vice president, whose diversion of the funds into an account under 
the name of a third party was “the very fraud of which [the investors] 
complain[ed]. Having turned over their funds to Oppenheimer’s 
representative so as to become customers of Oppenheimer, the 
Claimants did not lose the legal benefits of customer status because 
Oppenheimer’s representative fraudulently established their account 
in a manner designed to conceal and defeat their interest.”74 
The Second Circuit revisited the privity issue in John Hancock 
Life Insurance Co. v. Wilson, at one level removed, where investors 
intended to invest with a representative of a FINRA member but were 
not aware of the representative’s relationship with the FINRA 
member.75 In John Hancock, the investors purchased fraudulent 
promissory notes from a broker.76 Although the broker was a 
registered representative of John Hancock, a FINRA member, the 
investors were unaware of the relationship between the broker and 
John Hancock and did not intend to invest through John Hancock.77 
Further, John Hancock had not authorized the broker to sell the 
promissory notes at issue, nor did John Hancock have knowledge that 
the broker was selling the products.78 As the Second Circuit 
summarized, “The only possible connection between John Hancock 
and the Investors was through their independent relationships with 
[the representative].”79 
In finding that the investors were nonetheless customers of John 
Hancock, the Second Circuit began by examining the Rule as a whole 
and noted that in several places it refers both to the “member and/or 
                                                                                                             
 71. 56 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 72. Id. at 354. 
 73. Id. at 357. 
 74. Id. 
 75. 254 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
192 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
the associated person.”80 The Second Circuit then emphasized both 
that FINRA’s negative definition of “customer” is very broad and that 
courts interpreting the Rule have supported “a broad interpretation of 
the term ‘customer.’”81 Relying solely on the plain language of the 
Rule, the court concluded that the investor was entitled to demand 
arbitration from John Hancock.82 
The Second Circuit revisited the privity issue a third time in 
Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, at yet another level of removal.83 In 
Bensadoun, the Second Circuit considered the issue of whether 
investors, whose broker was a customer of a member’s associated 
person, can also claim to be customers of the member.84 As alleged 
by the respondents,85 the investors had given their money to a third 
party, Autard, to invest the money through his own Swiss company.86 
Autard then opened an account with Bensadoun, and only Autard and 
the Swiss company had control of the account.87 The Swiss company 
went bankrupt and Autard was arrested for embezzlement, so neither 
was named in the complaint.88 The issue before the Second Circuit 
was whether the fact that Autard invested the investors’ funds with 
Bensadoun made the investors customers of Bensadoun.89 
The Second Circuit focused on a need for a “direct customer 
relationship between the associated person and the purported 
customer.”90 In particular, the Second Circuit focused on whether the 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. at 58 (“First, the Investors’ claims must constitute a ‘dispute . . . 
between a customer and a member and/or associated person.’ Second, the 
dispute must ‘aris[e] in connection with the business of such member or in 
connection with the activities of such associated persons.’” (quoting NASD R. 
10301)). This is not a particularly compelling argument because FINRA 
arbitrates disputes between customers and both members and associated persons, 
so the Rule’s disjunctive use of “member and/or the associated person” could be 
seen as clarifying that the rule applies. See FINRA R. 12101 (2013), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=5179
&element_id=4100&highlight=applicability&print=1. 
 81. John Hancock, 254 F.3d at 60. 
 82. Id. (“As our decision today is grounded in the plain language of the 
relevant provisions of the NASD Code, we do not delve into any extrinsic 
evidence regarding the NASD’s intent.” (citation omitted)). 
 83. 316 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Here, [as compared to John 
Hancock], the entire framework is removed by one level.”). 
 84. Id. at 175−76. 
 85. The Second Circuit in Bensadoun was considering a district court’s 
dismissal of an action to stay arbitration, and so the question before the court 
was whether there was a “[t]riable [i]ssue as to [w]hether the [i]nvestors 
[q]ualify as ‘[c]ustomers’ of Bensadoun[.]” Id. at 175. 
 86. Id. at 173. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 175−76. 
 90. Id. at 176. 
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customers had relinquished investment authority to Autard and 
considered the parade of horribles if “every purchaser of shares in a 
mutual fund and every beneficiary of a pension fund would arguably 
be ‘customers’ of every investment institution with which those funds 
do business, and would be entitled to demand arbitration under the 
NASD.”91 The Second Circuit thus established the rule that “where 
investors pool their funds and relinquish all investment authority to a 
third party who deals with an NASD broker, that third-party, not the 
investors, will normally be the broker’s customer.”92 
Neidhardt and John Hancock have come to stand for the 
proposition that an investor’s relationship with an associated person 
of a FINRA member will create a customer relationship with the 
broker–dealer even if there is no direct relationship between the 
investor and the broker–dealer.93 And Bensadoun establishes the limit 
to that proposition: Where investors invest through a third-party 
broker and the broker invests with the associated person of a FINRA 
member, the investors will not be customers of the associated 
person.94 
Courts have applied these principles in a number of contexts. The 
Eighth Circuit in Berthel Fisher & Co. Financial Services  v. Larmon 
held that investors who purchase securities from a selling group 
member in an initial offering are not customers of the managing 
broker–dealer who manages the underwriting.95 As managing broker–
dealer of the underwriting, 
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. at 177. 
 92. Id. at 178. 
 93. See, e.g., Vestax Sec. Corp. v. McWood, 280 F.3d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir. 
2002) (citing John Hancock and Oppenheimer for the proposition that “[a] 
number of courts have held that an agent or representative of a financial services 
firm is an ‘associated person’ under NASD Rule 10301(a) such that a 
relationship with the agent entitles the investor to the arbitration process[,]” 
while reaching the same result); MONY Sec. Corp. v. Bornstein, 390 F.3d 1340, 
1344 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We thus hold that the Bornsteins are customers under 
the applicable NASD Rules because it is undisputed that they are customers of 
Keller, and that Keller was an associated person with MONY.”); Contemporary 
Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Miller, No. 07-cv-00793-MSK, 2007 WL 4197588, at *4 
(D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2007) (“In addition, to be a customer of an ‘associated 
person,’ the investor need not have any knowledge of the associated person’s 
affiliation with the NASD member, nor need the associated person have been 
given authority by the NASD member to conduct the particular transaction.”). 
 94. See Black, supra note 7, at 422–23 (noting that courts have consistently 
held that investors are not “customers” of a firm when they “[do] business with a 
person who was not associated with the firm, who in turn transacted business 
with the firm” (footnote omitted)). 
 95. 695 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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Berthel assembled a group of FINRA-registered broker-
dealers—Selling Group Members, or SGMs—who in turn 
offered the securities to their own customers, including the 
Investors. . . . Berthal reviewed at least two of the PPMs, 
suggesting changes that [the issuer] adopted. Per the 
agreement between Berthel and the SGMs, Berthel collected 
investor payments from the SGMs and passed those payments 
along to Geneva.96 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the investors were not 
customers of the managing broker–dealer because Berthel provided 
its services to the selling group members, not to the investors.97 The 
court noted that “the provision of ‘investment or brokerage related 
services’ is only half of the picture—not only must the FINRA 
member firm provide those services, but also must it provide those 
services to the customer either directly or through its associated 
persons.”98 
In Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Silverman, the Fourth Circuit held 
that investors who purchased securities after an initial public offering 
from third parties in the secondary market were not customers of the 
underwriter of the initial public offering.99  Investors complained that 
Morgan Keegan had distributed misleading marketing material and 
directly encouraged their broker to purchase the securities.100 The 
Fourth Circuit noted that the investors did not purchase any services 
or commodities from Morgan Keegan but rather purchased shares 
from a third party.101 The court found that contact between Morgan 
Keegan and the investor’s broker was insufficient to make the 
investors “customers” of Morgan Keegan.102 
In Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Cary,103 the Fourth 
Circuit held that investors who purchase securities from a third party 
who was purportedly acting as an agent or coconspirator of a 
registered representative were not customers of the registered 
representative or his member firm.104 The investors in Raymond 
James admitted that they bought their securities directly through the 
issuer and that they had no personal contact with the registered 
representative, were not told that the third party who sold them the 
                                                                                                             
 96. Id. at 751. 
 97. Id. at 753. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 706 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 100. Id. at 564. 
 101. Id. at 567–68. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 709 F.3d 382, 388 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 104. Id. 
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securities was affiliated with Raymond James, and did not understand 
that they were purchasing the security from Raymond James or an 
agent authorized to act on its behalf.105 But the investors contended 
that the registered representative was receiving commissions from 
their transactions based on an agreement with the third-party broker to 
split all commissions, thereby establishing the requisite 
relationship.106 The Fourth Circuit noted that “mere interaction 
between a member firm and a third party [will not] transform an 
investor who dealt only with the third party into a customer of the 
member firm.”107 Because the investors did not purchase any 
commodities or services from the FINRA member, they were not 
customers.108 
B. Issuers of Securities 
A number of courts have considered whether an entity that issues 
securities—either stocks or bonds—that are underwritten or 
remarketed by a FINRA member is a customer that can demand 
arbitration.109 Issuers, whether corporate, governmental, or nonprofit, 
occupy the opposite end of the securities spectrum from investors. 
They turn to FINRA members not to purchase products but rather to 
raise funds through the sale of securities for a variety of projects. 
                                                                                                             
 105. Id. at 384–85. 
 106. Id. at 386−87. 
 107. Id. at 387. Interestingly, the court emphasized that the third-party broker 
had neither actual nor apparent authority from Raymond James, suggesting that 
apparent authority might create a customer relationship in the appropriate case. 
Id. at 387–88. 
 108. Id. at 388. 
 109. See Alison Frankel, Banks, Bond Issuers and FINRA: A Match Made in 
Federal Court, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Oct. 2, 2012. As the 
article stated: 
UBS argued that ARS issuers don’t fall within FINRA’s definition of a 
brokerage customer. Despite the bank’s protests, judges in Virginia and 
California sided with the issuers and declined to enjoin their FINRA 
arbitrations. This week’s decisions are the latest in a string of federal 
court rulings that have generally supported debt issuers’ insistence that 
they are brokerage clients. Financial services firms such as UBS, 
JPMorgan, Citigroup and Goldman Sachs have argued that FINRA 
arbitration is only available to traditional clients. But at least five U.S. 
district judges have ruled that issuers of municipal or corporate debt 
can be considered customers, thus permitting their FINRA arbitrations 
to move forward. 
Id. 
196 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
Unlike the privity cases, these issuer cases consider the range of 
relationships that can justify customer status.110 
The Third Circuit was the first court to consider whether an issuer 
was a customer of a FINRA member in Patten Securities Corp. v. 
Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc.111 In Patten, a Colorado 
corporation contracted with Patten to serve as underwriter for the sale 
of the corporation’s shares and warrants.112 When the parties never 
consummated the deal, the corporation demanded arbitration, and 
Patten sought to enjoin the arbitration, contending that the corporation 
was not Patten’s customer.113 The court did not extensively analyze 
the legal issue, instead relying on an interpretive statement from the 
NASD’s National Arbitration Committee that stated, “An issuer of 
securities should be considered a public customer of a member firm 
where a dispute arises over a proposed underwriting.”114 The court 
concluded that because the interpretive statements of the Committee 
were final, conclusive, and binding on NASD members, the 
corporation was a customer entitled to demand arbitration.115 
The issue next arose in J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. v. Louisiana 
Citizens Property Insurance Corp.116  In that case, the Southern 
District of New York considered whether an issuer of auction rate 
securities (ARS) was a customer of a FINRA member that served 
both as underwriter and remarketer of the bonds.117 The issuer in 
Louisiana Citizens alleged that J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns 
advised118 Citizens to issue auction rate bonds and received fees and 
compensation for acting as the co-lead underwriters and providing 
bridge financing in connection therewith.119 According to Citizens, 
J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns were manipulating the market for 
                                                                                                             
 110. See Ross Sinclaire & Assocs. v. Premier Senior Living, LLC, No. 11-
CV-5104 YGR, 2012 WL 2501115, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (“However, 
no case in this district has addressed the situation here, that is, a situation where 
the connection between the purported customer and the FINRA member is 
undisputedly direct, but the ‘customer’ is a purchaser of services related to the 
issuance and sale of securities rather than an investor in securities.”). 
 111. 819 F.2d 400, 405–07 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds. 
 112. Id. at 402.  
 113. Id. at 402−03. 
 114. Id. at 406. 
 115. Id. 
 116. 712 F. Supp. 2d 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 117. “Auction rate securities” are long-term bonds with interest rates that 
reset in periodic auctions. Issuers of ARS engaged FINRA members—often the 
same firm that performed the underwriting—to conduct the auctions, and only 
authorized broker–dealers were entitled to submit bids in the periodic auctions. 
Id. at 77–79. 
 118. Citizens alleged that J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns acted as advisers for 
the bond structure, but the underwriters disputed this fact. Id. at 73. 
 119. Id. at 72–73. 
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auction rate bonds to maintain the appearance that the bonds would 
generate interest rates favorable to Citizens, and when they 
discontinued these manipulations, the market collapsed causing 
economic loss to Citizens.120 J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns sought to 
enjoin a FINRA arbitration filed by Citizens, contending that 
customers should be limited to investors.121 
The court in Louisiana Citizens rejected that argument.122 It noted 
first that Fleet Boston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Innovex, Inc., the 
principal case relied upon by J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns, cited 
Patten with approval, saying that “although the relationship [in 
Patten] was not a broker/investor relationship, [the issuer/underwriter 
relationship] still related directly to the issuance of securities, rather 
than banking advice.”123 It then noted that while many cases conclude 
that an investor is a customer of the financial firm that acts as its 
broker, “they do not support the conclusion that the broker–investor 
relationship is the only relationship sufficient to satisfy Rule 12200. 
The rule that an investor is a customer of its broker is a rule of 
inclusion, not exclusion.”124 In light of the Second Circuit’s 
precedents instructing courts to interpret ambiguity in favor of 
arbitration,125 the nonrestrictive definition of “customer” provided by 
FINRA, and the lack of precedent further restricting the term, the 
court in Louisiana Citizens concluded that issuers were customers of 
underwriters and could demand arbitration of their disputes.126 
In UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. West Virginia University 
Hospitals, Inc., the Second Circuit addressed whether issuers are 
customers in a case presenting largely identical facts to Louisiana 
Citizens.127 West Virginia University Hospitals (WVUH) also issued 
ARS with UBS serving as its underwriter and broker–dealer.128 
WVUH contended that it was a customer because it paid UBS for 
these broker–dealer services, although UBS countered that the 
parties’ contracts provided that UBS would facilitate the auctions “for 
the benefit of the beneficial owners of the [ARS].”129 
                                                                                                             
 120. Id. at 74. 
 121. Id. at 78. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fleet Boston Robertson Stephens, 
Inc. v. Innovex, Inc., 264 F.3d 770, 773 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 78–79. 
 126. Id. This conclusion, of course, also hinged on the court finding that the 
other elements of FINRA Rule 12200 were met. 
 127. See 660 F.3d 643, 650–52 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 128. Id. at 645. 
 129. Id. at 646. The court later rejected the argument that just because the 
contract between UBS and WVUH referred to the payment as being for the 
benefit of the public, that the public—and not WVUH—was a customer of UBS 
198 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
In finding that WVUH was a customer of UBS entitled to demand 
arbitration, the Second Circuit relied heavily on the fact that WVUH 
bought specific services from UBS, namely broker–dealer services.130 
Relying on the dictionary definition of “customer” as “someone who 
buys goods or services,”131 the court adopted a definition of 
“customer” that included “at least a non-broker or a non-dealer who 
purchases, or undertakes to purchase, a good or service from a 
FINRA member.”132 The court reached this definition based on the 
broad scope of the FINRA rules, broad definitions found in other 
FINRA publications,133 and the lack of prior precedents purporting to 
give an “exhaustive” definition of “customer.”134 Given the broad 
scope of the term, the court concluded that where WVUH paid for 
UBS to perform broker–dealer services, WVUH was a “customer” 
under FINRA 12200.135 Significantly, though, the court limited its 
finding to the broker–dealer relationship and did not decide whether 
the underwriter–issuer relationship was sufficient to make WVUH a 
customer of UBS.136 
UBS also argued that FINRA arbitration was not intended for 
sophisticated parties like WVUH that are not investors and that 
allowing issuers to arbitrate does not serve FINRA’s “investor-
protection mandate.”137 The court rejected these arguments, noting 
that FINRA’s rules contemplate arbitration in “large or complex 
cases” and that FINRA’s purposes are clearly broader than investor 
                                                                                                             
 
under the broker–dealer agreement. “We reject UBS’s suggestion that WVUH, a 
sophisticated party seeking to raise capital, charitably undertook to pay a 
substantial fee for the benefit of unknown investors rather than itself.” Id. at 651. 
 130. Id. at 648. 
 131. Id. at 650. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 650 (quoting Glossary of Arbitration Terms, FINRA, http://www 
.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Glossary/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (defining 
“customer” as “[a] person or entity (not acting in the capacity of an associated 
person or member) that transacts business with any member firm and/or 
associated person”)). Remarkably, after the publication of the decision, FINRA 
altered this page of its website to replace the definition of “customer” with a 
definition of “investor” that is substantively identical. See Glossary of 
Arbitration Terms, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation 
/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Glossary/ (last visited Oct. 24, 
2013) (defining “investor” as “[a] person or entity (not acting in the capacity of 
an associated person or member) that transacts business with any member firm 
and/or associated person”). 
 134. W. Va. Univ. Hosps, 660 F.3d at 650. 
 135. Id. at 651–52. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 652. 
2013] DEFINING “CUSTOMER” 199 
 
 
 
protection.138 Finally, the court gave little credence to UBS’s 
contention that a customer relationship would require “a fiduciary 
relationship and cannot be founded on arm’s length transactions,” 
finding no support for this proposition in “the text or the structure of 
the FINRA Rules.”139 
Interestingly, the Second Circuit’s decision engendered a lengthy 
dissent. The dissent focused on whether WVUH could be a customer 
of its underwriter and attacked the application of the majority’s 
definition: 
The majority focuses on the plain-meaning definition of 
“customer”: one who “purchases, or undertakes to purchase a 
good or service from a FINRA member.” . . . There is no 
record evidence in this case that WVUH undertook to pay or 
paid, in any form, UBS for underwriting the issuance of 
WVUH ARS or providing advice in connection with the 
issuance. As in any other negotiated underwriting transaction, 
UBS purchased the WVUH ARS from WVUH at a discount 
and resold the ARS in the market to UBS's customers. In that 
transaction, UBS took on the risks inherent in an offering of 
securities, and there is no record evidence that WVUH carried 
a cost for this transaction on its books. Thus, as explained 
below, WVUH did not “purchase” any goods or services from 
UBS pursuant to the underwriting agreement and thus did not 
become UBS’s customer pursuant to that agreement.140 
The dissent’s principal complaint with the majority’s reasoning 
was that the majority “shoehorned” a dispute about underwriting into 
arbitration based on payments for an unrelated transaction.141 But 
fundamentally, the dissent agreed with the majority’s definition of 
“customer” that included an issuer who purchases services from an 
underwriter; the dissent’s dispute was simply whether that standard 
was met by WVUH.142 
Completing a triptych of ARS cases, the Fourth Circuit in UBS 
Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion Clinic addressed whether an 
issuer of auction rate securities was a customer for purposes of 
FINRA 12200.143 The facts of Carilion were similar to Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 138. Id. at 651. 
 139. Id. at 652. 
 140. Id. at 659 (Preska, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 141. Id. at 660, 662 (“It is not reasonable, as the majority opinion presumes, 
to think that the parties to the FINRA Rules agreed that once ‘customer’ status is 
established through a single transaction or agreement, any related matter may be 
arbitrated.”). 
 142. Id. at 656.  
 143. 706 F.3d 319, 323–28 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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Citizens and West Virginia University Hospitals, although Carilion 
alleged that in addition to payments for serving as broker–dealer for 
Carilion’s auctions, in connection with the underwriting of Carilion’s 
bonds “UBS and Citi earned an underwriter’s discount, part of which 
constituted a management fee for their assistance in structuring and 
managing the transaction.”144 The Fourth Circuit followed the Second 
Circuit’s ruling in West Virginia University Hospitals but adopted a 
more comprehensive definition of “customer”: 
[W]e conclude that “customer,” as that term is used in the 
FINRA Rules, refers to one, not a broker or a dealer, who 
purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member in 
the course of the member’s business activities insofar as those 
activities are regulated by FINRA—namely investment 
banking and securities business activities.145 
Based on that definition and the management fee alleged by Carilion, 
the court had “little difficulty concluding that Carilion is such a 
‘customer.’”146 
C. Banking and Financial Advice 
The Eighth Circuit, in Fleet Boston, considered whether someone 
who received banking or financial advice, as opposed to investment 
                                                                                                             
 144. Id. at 322. 
 145. Id. at 327. 
 146. Id. See also Ross Sinclaire & Assocs. v. Premier Senior Living, LLC, 
No. 11-CV-5104 YGR, 2012 WL 2501115, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) 
(finding that an issuer is a customer where “the undisputed evidence shows that 
the PSL Defendants purchased from RPS investment advice and financial 
services in connection with the creation and sale of securities”); UBS Sec. LLC 
v. Allina Health Sys., Civil No. 12-2090 (MJD/JJG), 2013 WL 500373, at *5 
(D. Minn. Feb. 11, 2013) (“In light of the business relationship between Allina 
and UBS [issuer and underwriter/broker–dealer], and the services paid for and 
received by Allina, the Court finds that Allina is a customer of UBS as the term 
is defined in FINRA Rule 12100(i).”); UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 
No. CV 12-05019-RGK(JCx), 2012 WL 3132949, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 
2012) (“Here, Defendant hired Plaintiffs to perform the underwriting services on 
both of its ARS offerings. Given the business relationship existing between the 
two parties and the services received by Defendant, the Court finds that 
Defendant is likely a customer of Plaintiffs as that term is defined in Rule 
12100(i).”); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, No. 3:12-cv-00327-RCJ-
WGC, 2012 WL 5944966, at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 26, 2012) (“Here, as in [West 
Virginia University Hospitals], the FINRA member has provided more than 
financial advice, but rather has provided services directly related to the 
securities, i.e., facilitation of auctions of the securities themselves. The Court 
finds this to be sufficiently related to the broker-dealer function for the City [to] 
fall under the definition of ‘customer.’”). 
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or brokerage services, could qualify as a customer under the FINRA 
rules.147 The defendants sought to compel arbitration of claims 
relating to unpaid fees and expenses for financial and banking advice 
provided by Fleet Boston in connection with the defendants’ 
merger.148 The court rejected the defendants’ argument that “the 
NASD Rules were meant to apply to every sort of financial service an 
NASD member might provide, regardless of how remote that service 
might be from the investing or brokerage activities, which the NASD 
oversees.”149 
In particular, the Eighth Circuit surveyed the NASD Rules that 
addressed conduct of members toward investors,150 as well as a 
NASD Notice to Members describing the purpose of the arbitration 
forum as assisting “in the resolution of monetary and business 
disputes between investors and their securities firms,” and concluded 
that “customer” “refers to one involved in a business relationship with 
an NASD member that is related directly to investment or brokerage 
services.”151 The court further noted that even in cases that had 
suggested a broader view of “customer,” such as Neidhardt or Patten 
discussed above, “there existed some brokerage or investment 
relationship between the parties” or the relationship “related directly 
to the issuance of securities, rather than banking advice.”152 
The scope of noninvestment-related activities that could give rise 
to customer status was further explored by two Second Circuit cases 
involving derivative products purchased by VCG, a hedge fund: 
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master 
                                                                                                             
 147. 264 F.3d 770, 771 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he only question is whether [the 
plaintiff] is a ‘customer’ of Robertson Stephens under the NASD Code. This 
question hinges upon whether the term ‘customer’ applies only to those who 
received investment or brokerage services, or whether it also applies to those 
who received banking and financial advice, as [the plaintiff] did in this case.”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 772. 
 150. Id. (citing NASD Rules of Conduct § 2270; “§ 2230 (governing broker 
transaction confirmations); § 2260 (forwarding securities related information); § 
2280 (investor education); § 2310 (investment recommendations); § 2320 
(executing orders); § 2330 (maintaining customer’s securities and accounts); §§ 
2400-2460 (commissions on brokerage accounts and securities transactions); §§ 
2700-2780 (securities distributions)”). In a footnote, the court refuted the 
significance of “an isolated NASD Rule relating to membership and registration 
that defines a ‘customer’ to include those receiving investment banking services 
. . . . which d[id] not specifically deal with customer protection or relations, [as] 
insufficient to expand the definition of ‘customer’ for purposes of the arbitration 
provision.” Id. at 772 n.2 (citing NASD Membership and Registration Rule § 
1120(b)(1)). 
 151. Id. at 772. 
 152. Id. at 772, 773 n.3. 
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Fund Ltd.153 and Wachovia Bank, National Ass’n v. VCG Special 
Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd.154 In Citigroup, VCG alleged that it 
was Citigroup’s customer because it had a long-term brokerage 
relationship with Citigroup and Citigroup’s employees had 
“recommended and set the terms for” the credit default swap at issue 
between VCG and Citibank, a non-FINRA member.155 Citigroup 
responded that its employees, all FINRA-registered individuals, were 
serving as representatives of Citibank at the time and that the 
transaction was an arm’s-length transaction, where VCG explicitly 
disavowed any reliance on Citigroup’s employees.156 The district 
court granted a preliminary injunction of VCG’s arbitration, finding 
that there were serious questions that required further factual 
explication.157 The district court found that “financial advice and 
involvement with the terms of the CDS contract” could “create a 
customer relationship between [Citigroup] and VCG,” although there 
were factual disputes about the precise role played by Citigroup’s 
employees.158 The court further noted that although a credit default 
swap is not a security, “there is authority for the proposition that the 
term ‘arises in connection with the business activities’ of a FINRA 
member may apply to claims involving non-securities.”159 The district 
court nonetheless granted a preliminary injunction of the arbitration to 
allow for resolution of the outstanding factual issues, which was 
affirmed by the Second Circuit.160 As the Second Circuit described 
the holding of Citigroup in a later case, “Where there is a genuine 
dispute as to the role played by the FINRA member in connection 
with a credit default swap, a trial will be required.”161 
By comparison, in Wachovia Bank, the Second Circuit concluded 
that where a broker–dealer’s representatives participated in a 
transaction but did not recommend the transaction or otherwise have 
any “advisory, brokerage, or other fiduciary relationship,” the 
provision of business services will not give rise to a customer 
relationship.162 In Wachovia Bank, unlike Citigroup, VCG did not 
                                                                                                             
 153. 598 F.3d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 154. 661 F.3d 164, 172–74 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2439 
(2012). 
 155. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 33.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund 
Ltd., No. 08-CV-5520 (BSJ), 2008 WL 4891229, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 
2008), aff’d, 598 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 159. Id. at *5. 
 160. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 32.  
 161. Wachovia Bank, Nat. Ass’n v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, 
Ltd., 661 F.3d 164, 173 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 162. Id. at 174. 
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have a preexisting brokerage relationship with Wachovia, the parties 
expressly disclaimed any advisory relationship, and VCG admitted 
that “Wachovia did not recommend the deal to VCG.”163 
Accordingly, the court noted that because “there is no factual issue as 
to whether [Wachovia Bank] provided advice, recommendations, or 
other services to VCG,” “there is no need to grapple with the precise 
boundaries of the FINRA meaning of ‘customer.’”164 The court was 
confident that on these facts “no rational factfinder could infer that 
VCG was a customer of WCM.”165 
Finally, in Twenty-First Securities Corp. v. Crawford, an investor 
sought advice from a FINRA member about income-yielding 
investments, although the investor intended to buy the investments 
independently.166 The FINRA member sent materials to the investor 
and received a “solicitation fee” from the chosen fund once the 
investor invested.167 On these facts, the court had no trouble 
concluding that the plaintiff “was a customer of Twenty-First because 
he received investment advice from Gordon its president,” who 
received compensation for the plaintiff’s purchase.168 The fact that the 
FINRA member did not execute the transaction or otherwise hold the 
plaintiff’s securities or account did not prevent a finding that the 
plaintiff was a customer entitled to arbitrate.169 
D. Customers of Predecessor or Successor Members 
Apart from the question of what relationship is sufficient to create 
customer status, courts have also addressed timing issues regarding 
customer status. What if the investor conducts business with a 
predecessor entity? Can the investor claim customer status as to the 
current firm, even if the conduct complained about occurred 
previously? 
The principal case addressing this issue is Wheat, First Securities, 
Inc. v. Green.170 In Wheat, the investors had been customers of 
Marshall Securities when they alleged they were fraudulently induced 
to purchase investments.171 “Well after the allegedly fraudulent . . . 
transactions occurred,” Wheat, First Securities Inc. purchased 
                                                                                                             
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. No. 11 Civ. 6406(WHP), 2011 WL 6326128, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 
2011), aff’d, 502 F. App’x 64 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at *2. 
 169. Id. at *3. 
 170. 993 F.2d 814, 820–21 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 171. Id. at 815. 
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Marshall Securities.172 After the merger, the investors’ accounts were 
transferred from Marshall to Wheat, First.173 The investors sought to 
bring arbitration against Wheat, First, arguing that as current 
customers of Wheat, First they could seek arbitration based on 
conduct that occurred while they invested with the predecessor 
company.174 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this theory based on a contractual 
analysis of the “reasonable expectations of NASD members.”175 The 
court concluded that no reasonable NASD member could expect that 
NASD membership would require it to “arbitrate claims which arose 
while a claimant was a customer of another member merely because 
the claimant subsequently became its customer.”176 The court held 
that customer status “must be determined as of the time of the events 
providing the basis for the allegations of fraud.”177 Because they were 
not yet a customer at the time of the transactions, “they cannot invoke 
the NASD Code to compel Wheat, First to arbitrate.”178 
Subsequent cases have limited Wheat where although the 
fraudulent purchase occurred before the investor became a customer 
of the broker–dealer, the events giving rise to the claim continued into 
the period where the investor was a customer of the broker–dealer or 
where there are allegations of related misconduct that occurred after 
the investor became a customer of the broker–dealer. Thus, in O.N. 
Equity Sales Co. v. Gibson, although the investor purchased an initial 
offering from a broker before he became affiliated with the FINRA 
member, the investment was held in escrow until after the broker 
became affiliated with the member, and the offering was materially 
modified after the broker became affiliated with the member.179 The 
court held that where some facts giving rise to liability occurred 
during the period the broker was affiliated with the FINRA member, 
                                                                                                             
 172. Id. at 816. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 820. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. See also Gruntal & Co., Inc. v. Steinberg, 854 F. Supp. 324, 340 
(D.N.J. 1994), aff’d, 46 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he misconduct which is 
the subject of the Arbitration Proceedings took place, in its entirety, at least two 
months before the Steinbergs became customers of Gruntal. Because these acts 
were committed when the Steinbergs were not customers of Gruntal, Gruntal 
cannot be compelled to arbitrate with the Steinbergs by virtue of the NASD 
Code of Arbitration Procedure.” (citations omitted)). 
 179. 514 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 (S.D. W. Va. 2007). 
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the investor was a customer who could seek arbitration of the 
claims.180 
The issue of whether an investor can be a customer of their 
broker’s former broker–dealer firm was presented in SII Investments, 
Inc. v. Jenks.181 In Jenks, an investor claimed that her broker 
fraudulently advised her to invest in a newly-formed company, the 
stock of which was not yet available.182 After the broker left the 
broker–dealer firm, the investment became available and the investor 
purchased the investment.183 After the investment turned sour, the 
investor sought arbitration against SII Investments, her broker’s 
former firm.184 
The court in Jenks began its analysis with Wheat but found that it 
was distinguishable because in Wheat the investor had no relationship 
with the FINRA member at the time of the investment, whereas in 
Jenks the investor had an existing relationship and her claims were 
based in part on misrepresentations made while her broker was at SII 
Investments. Notably, the court focused on the date the 
representations were alleged to have occurred, rather than the date 
that damages were sustained.185 Because the purchases “grew out of 
and were a natural consequence of” the broker’s misrepresentations 
while at SII, the investor “was SII’s customer at the time of the events 
providing the basis for the allegations of her claims.”186 
IV. DEFINITIONS OF “CUSTOMER” 
As demonstrated in the survey in Section III of the decisions that 
have addressed the term “customer,” courts have generated several 
different definitions of “customer” under Rule 12200. This Section 
lays out four of the main definitions of “customer” that have been 
embraced by courts, with an eye toward identifying the drawbacks in 
each definition. 
                                                                                                             
 180. Id. See also World Grp. Sec., Inc. v. Sanders, No. 2:06-CV-00107 PGC, 
2006 WL 1278738, at *4–5 (D. Utah May 8, 2006) (finding that investor was 
customer where her claims involved not only fraudulent conveyance at a 
predecessor broker–dealer but also negligent supervision at the defendant 
broker–dealer during a period when she was a customer). 
 181. 370 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1217–19 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
 182. Id. at 1214–15. 
 183. Id. at 1216. 
 184. Id. at 1214. 
 185. Id. at 1218. 
 186. Id. at 1219. 
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A. “Shall Not Include a Broker or Dealer” 
This definition, which has the advantage of being specifically 
included in the FINRA rules, has been largely rejected by courts as an 
adequate definition. Even those courts that appear to have decided 
customer cases based on little beyond this definition, such as the John 
Hancock court,187 have felt compelled to cite the general interpretive 
rule that all doubts about the scope of an arbitration provision must be 
construed in favor of arbitration.188 
The FINRA provision is unsatisfying because, among other 
things, it does not purport to exhaustively define the term “customer.” 
“Shall not include” does not require, as matter of logic, that 
everything not listed be included. 
A deeper look at the structure of the FINRA rules suggests that 
the FINRA definition of “customer” is not meant to define who can 
invoke Rule 12200 but instead is meant to clarify which of FINRA’s 
two sets of arbitration procedures applies to disputes between FINRA 
members. FINRA’s Code contains two largely parallel sets of 
arbitration provisions: one for customer disputes and one for industry 
disputes.189 The negative definition of customer, which mostly affects 
FINRA members only, clarifies that the Industry Code applies to all 
disputes between FINRA members, even if one member could be 
considered a customer of the other in the subject transaction. On this 
reading, the definition was never meant to identify the scope of 
parties who could invoke the FINRA forum under Rule 12200 but 
rather was meant to exclude FINRA members from arbitrations under 
the customer rules. 
                                                                                                             
 187. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d 48, 59–60 (2d Cir. 
2001). The Second Circuit later described its decision in John Hancock as 
“avoid[ing] offering an exhaustive definition of the term [customer].” UBS Fin. 
Servs., Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 650 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(citation omitted). 
 188. See John Hancock, 254 F.3d at 59 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. 
v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (“The Arbitration Act 
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem 
at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of 
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”)). 
 189. Compare FINRA R. 12100–12905 (2013), available at http://finra 
.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4096 
(Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes) with FINRA R. 13100–
13905 (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main 
.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4193 (Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry 
Disputes). 
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B. “One Who Receives Investment and Brokerage Services” 
In Fleet Boston, the Eighth Circuit almost in passing created a 
definition of “customer” as “one who receives investment and 
brokerage services” that was widely cited by courts around the 
country.190 Ironically, although the reference to “investment and 
brokerage services” is the section most widely cited, the full context 
of the Eighth Circuit’s quote makes clear that it did not mean to 
restrict the definition solely to the recipients of investment and 
brokerage services: “Although not entirely clear, or consistent, other 
NASD Rules support a general definition of ‘customer’ as one who 
receives investment and brokerage services or otherwise deals more 
directly with securities than what occurred here.”191 The Eighth 
Circuit’s holding excluded financial advice from the relationships that 
would give rise to a customer relationship, and the Eighth Circuit 
clarified that it was not rejecting the Third Circuit’s analysis in 
Patten, which held that an issuer was a customer of its underwriter.192 
So the Eighth Circuit explicitly did not limit the definition of 
“customer” solely to investment or brokerage relationships. 
                                                                                                             
 190. Fleet Boston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Innovex, Inc., 264 F.3d 770, 
772 (8th Cir. 2001). See, e.g., Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Shadburn, 829 F. Supp. 
2d 1141, 1148 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit held that a ‘customer’ is 
one who ‘receive[s] investment or brokerage related services, from an NASD 
member,’ . . . .” (alteration in original)); Zarecor v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. 
4:10CV01643 SWW, 2011 WL 5592861, at *4 (E.D. Ark. July 29, 2011) (“The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the term ‘customer’ under Rule 12200 
‘refers to one involved in a business relationship with [a FINRA] member that is 
related directly to investment or brokerage related services.’” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)); Oppenheimerfunds Distrib., Inc. v. Liska, No. 11-
CV-1586 BEN (WMc), 2011 WL 5984036, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011) 
(“When the relationship between the parties is more tenuous, the court should 
determine whether there is ‘some brokerage or investment relationship between 
the parties.’”); O.N. Equity Sales Co. v. Rahner, 526 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1201 (D. 
Colo. 2007) (“The Eighth Circuit, relying upon various other NASD Rules, 
concluded that to be a ‘customer’ for purposes of Rule 10301, an individual 
must be ‘involved in a business relationship with an NASD member that is 
related directly to investment or brokerage services.’” (citation omitted)); 
Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Louise Silverman Trust, Civil No. JFM-11-2533, 
2012 WL 113400, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2012), aff’d sub nom, Morgan Keegan 
& Co., Inc. v. Silverman, 706 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals interpreted ‘customer’ to mean an individual who is ‘involved 
in a business relationship with [a FINRA] member that is related directly to 
investment or brokerage related services.’” (footnote omitted) (citation 
omitted)). 
 191. Fleet Boston, 264 F.3d at 772 (emphasis added). 
 192. See id. at 773 n.3 (“Although the relationship between the two [in 
Patten] was not a broker/investor relationship, it still related directly to the 
issuance of securities, rather than banking advice, and is thus unavailing here.”). 
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A definition of “customer” limited to investment or brokerage 
relationships is clearly not derived from the text of the FINRA rule, 
which references only “business activities” and an exclusion of 
“insurance.” Such a definition is also not derived from the scope of 
FINRA’s regulatory activities, which exceed investments and broker-
dealing, as demonstrated by the issuer decisions.193 A decision 
limiting “customer” to investment or brokerage relationships would 
graft an unwarranted judicial gloss on the rules of an arbitral forum, 
locking some parties out of FINRA arbitration without any 
compelling reason. Luckily, most cases citing Fleet Boston for this 
proposition have been cases concerning privity rather than the scope 
of business activities that give rise to a customer relationship.194 The 
authors are not aware of a case that cites Fleet Boston to actually limit 
FINRA arbitration to investment or brokerage relationships to the 
exclusion of other FINRA-regulated relationships. 
C. “One Who Buys Goods or Services” 
The Second Circuit, in West Virginia University Hospitals, 
proposed a “core definition” of “customer” as “one who buys goods 
or services.”195 It reached this result primarily based on the 
dictionary,196 as well as the general agreement of the parties.197 And it 
admitted in the decision that it was not attempting to “provide a 
comprehensive definition of the term under Rule 12200.”198 
Like the negative FINRA definition, this definition seems 
overbroad. Although the Eighth Circuit’s investment or brokerage 
gloss is an arbitrary judicial creation, it at least rationalizes 
“customer” by limiting it to a range of the activities FINRA regulates. 
                                                                                                             
 193. See Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 
F.2d 400, 406 (3d. Cir. 1987) (citing interpretive statement of the NASD’s 
National Arbitration Committee for “[a]n issuer of securities should be 
considered a public customer of a member firm where a dispute arises over a 
proposed underwriting”). 
 194. See, e.g., Shadburn, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1150–51; Zarecor, 2011 WL 
5592861, at *4–5; Liska, 2011 WL 5984036, at *2–5; Rahner, 526 F. Supp. 2d 
1195 at 1200–02; Louise Silverman Trust, 2012 WL 113400, at *3. 
 195. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 650 
(2d Cir. 2011) (“The term ‘customer’ includes at least a non-broker or non-
dealer who purchases, or undertakes to purchase, a good or services from a 
FINRA member.”). 
 196. The Second Circuit cited both Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (3d ed. 2002) and American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (4th ed. 2000). 
 197. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 660 F.3d at 650 (“UBS asserts, and the parties 
conceded at oral argument, that ‘customer’ means ‘someone who buys goods or 
services.’”). 
 198. Id. 
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The Second Circuit’s definition, if taken literally, might allow 
arbitration to be demanded by a corporation that leases space from a 
FINRA member or rents back office support. The Second Circuit 
surely did not mean to cover such “goods or services” and would be 
very unlikely to allow arbitration if such an issue arose in front of 
them. 
D. “One Who Purchases Commodities or Services that Are Regulated 
by FINRA” 
The Fourth Circuit, in Carilion, proposed the most comprehensive 
definition: 
“Customer,” as that term is used in the FINRA Rules, refers to 
one, not a broker or a dealer, who purchases commodities or 
services from a FINRA member in the course of the 
member’s business activities insofar as those activities are 
regulated by FINRA—namely investment banking and 
securities business activities.199 
The same decision went on to hold that an issuer will ordinarily 
be a customer of its underwriter, demonstrating that the Fourth 
Circuit’s understanding of “investment banking and securities 
business activities” is likely broader than the “investment and 
brokerage services” contemplated by the Eighth Circuit.200 The 
Fourth Circuit applied this same definition in Silverman and Raymond 
James, which clarified that the purchase must be directly from the 
FINRA member so that privity is required to claim customer status.201 
Of the various definitions proposed by courts, the Fourth Circuit’s 
has the advantage of harmonizing the ordinary understanding of 
“customer”—one who purchases something—with the purpose of 
FINRA arbitration—to resolve disputes that arise within the scope of 
FINRA’s regulatory authority. Rather than artificially limit FINRA 
arbitration to a judicially preferred set of activities like investment and 
brokerage services, the limitation is set by FINRA’s own scope. It 
also provides the right to FINRA arbitration for those customers most 
likely to need it: If the transaction a customer is executing is within 
the scope of activities regulated by FINRA, the customer will be 
entitled to demand arbitration. 
                                                                                                             
 199. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 327 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
 200. Id. at 326–27. 
 201. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Silverman, 706 F.3d 562, 566–67 (4th 
Cir. 2013); Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Cary, 709 F.3d 382, 386–87 (4th 
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Relying on the scope of FINRA-regulated activity makes the 
Fourth Circuit’s rule slightly more difficult to apply than simply 
looking at whether the putative customer purchased something or is 
not a broker or dealer. Yet it avoids the absurd situations that arise 
under an extremely broad rule. The parties to a FINRA arbitration, 
which always includes at least one member, should also be well 
equipped to determine whether or not the transaction was within 
FINRA’s regulatory scope, somewhat lessening the difficulty of 
applying this definition. 
CONCLUSION 
As noted above, courts have employed a wide array of definitions 
and analyses when determining whether or not a claimant falls within 
FINRA’s definition of “customer” and thus can demand arbitration 
under FINRA Rule 12200. If the SEC soon bans the use of PDAAs in 
brokerage agreements, as it is granted the discretion to do under the 
Dodd–Frank Act and as members of Congress are requesting,202 
arbitration of consumer securities disputes may soon be largely at the 
voluntary demand of customers of FINRA members. Who is—or is 
not—deemed a “customer” will be crucial for determining the forum 
that resolves securities disputes. As such, it is now vitally important 
for courts to arrive at a clear and concise definition of what it means 
to be a “customer” of a FINRA member. Rather than allow the 
confusion over interpreting the term to continue, other federal circuits 
should adopt the Fourth Circuit’s definition of “customer” because it 
provides certainty to the parties and serves the general purpose of 
FINRA. 
Adopting the Fourth Circuit’s “customer” analysis will create a 
comprehensive definition of who can demand arbitration in FINRA, 
providing certainty to both customers and the FINRA members who 
do business with them. This uniform approach will increase 
efficiency in the filing of arbitrations, decreasing the number of times 
that customers are dragged into federal court to litigate whether they 
are actually customers of the FINRA member.203 This certainty will 
also allow both customers and FINRA members to better arrange 
their business relationships because they can anticipate the proper 
forum and its procedural rules. FINRA members need to know which 
of their activities, and activities with whom, will give rise to the 
customer relationship. Clients of FINRA members similarly need 
clear guidance on precisely when they are entitled to demand 
arbitration. The Fourth Circuit’s definition of “customer” provides the 
                                                                                                             
 202. See discussion supra note 13. 
 203. See discussion supra note 7 and accompanying sources. 
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type of certainty necessary for parties to move forward efficiently and 
effectively toward resolving their securities disputes. 
Most importantly, adopting the Fourth Circuit’s rule on the 
parameters of a FINRA “customer” will serve the purpose of FINRA 
because it will ensure non-FINRA members who interact with 
FINRA-regulated entities that they will have a forum for efficient 
resolution of securities disputes.204 FINRA’s mission statement is 
very broad, reaching well beyond simply protecting investors: 
“FINRA is dedicated to investor protection and market integrity 
through effective and efficient regulation of the securities 
industry.”205 A more comprehensive definition of “customer” will 
advance FINRA’s mission and the interests of all those FINRA 
oversees: its members, the customers of those members, and the 
securities industry as a whole. 
Know your customer, the old adage goes.206 Resolution of this 
issue is necessary so that FINRA members can truly know who their 
customers are. 
  
                                                                                                             
 204. See Carilion, 706 F.3d at 327. As the Fourth Circuit stated in upholding a 
broad interpretation of the term “customer”: 
UBS and Citi argue that our holding is inconsistent with FINRA’s stated 
purpose of “protecting investors.” As we have already pointed out, 
however, even though FINRA undertakes in its mission to protect 
investors, it also serves a broader purpose, that of serving as “the sole self-
regulatory organization chartered under the Exchange Act to exercise 
comprehensive oversight of the securities industry.” Its mission includes 
the specific purpose of promoting observance of federal and state securities 
laws and investigating and adjusting grievances between the public and 
FINRA members under those laws. FINRA Rule 12200 serves that 
mission. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 205. See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2013). 
 206. This old adage has been specifically codified into the FINRA rules as one 
of the critical cogs in FINRA’s regulation of brokers and dealers. See FINRA Rule 
2090 (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main 
.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9858; FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 11-02, KNOW 
YOUR CUSTOMER AND SUITABILITY 1 (2011), available at http://www.finra.org 
/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p122778.pdf (“The 
know-your-customer and suitability obligations are critical to ensuring investor 
protection and promoting fair dealing with customers and ethical sales practices.”). 
See generally Genci Bilali, Know Your Customer—Or Not, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 
319, 327 (2012) (outlining the role of “Know Your Customer” rules in securities 
regulation). 
